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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Advanced legal minds, recognizing the need for swift
and certain conviction of criminals and realizing that some
of our procedural, as well as substantive, law has become so
obsolete as to be a clog on the wheels of justice, recommend
the abolition of technicalities which prevent the punishment
of wrongdoers. As so well expressed by the Pennsylvania
court: "Mere technical matters which do not affect the
merits receive much less consideration than they did a cen-
tury ago."' '
There is need for statutory reform, both of the distinc-
tion between felony and misdemeanor, and concerning the
fatal effect on indictments of such insignificant errors.
LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR TORT OF CHILD
Rounds, Admr. v. Phillips et al.'
Kerrigan v. Carroll et al.2
In the first principal case the trial court held demurrable
the declaration of the plaintiff administratrix, who sought
to recover for the pain and suffering of her decedent caused
by the tort of the child of the defendants in the negligent
driving of an automobile which resulted in the death both of
the plaintiff's decedent and of the defendants' said child.
On appeal, Held: Reversed and new trial awarded. The
declaration alleged that the said defendants permitted and
failed to prohibit the operation of the automobile by the said
child when they knew or should have known that he was
negligent, reckless, and incompetent in the operation of
automobiles. The Court said that this was sufficient, if
proven, to create liability on the part of the parents for
their primary negligence, regardless of any theory of im-
puted negligence, or actual agency, or of the "family car
doctrine", the rejection of which, in Maryland, the Court
reasserted. The Court held that an automobile is a poten-
tially dangerous, rather than an inherently dangerous in-
strumentality. The Court relied on the Restatement of the
Law of Torts8 to reach the end of liability. It was held im-
material, as to the father, that the title to the automobile
was in the name of the mother, because the father had the
power to prohibit the child's use of the automobile.
27 Staeger v. Comm., 8upra, note 26.
1 166 Md. 151, 178 AtM 532 (1934).
'168 Md. 682, 179 AtM 53 (1935).
s Restatement, Torts, Sec. 390 (was Sec. 260 when cited by the Court).
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On the new trial of the first principal case the trial court
directed a verdict for the defendants, who appealed from
the resulting adverse judgment and it was Held: Reversed
and new trial awarded. There was sufficient evidence to go
to the jury of the parents' knowledge, or possibility of
knowledge of the child's recklessness in the operation of
automobiles and of the risk of harm to himself and others.'
In the second principal case the trial court held de-
murrable a declaration filed by a domestic servant against
two defendants and their child, the third defendant, for that
the said child had negligently ignited some gasoline which
had been spread on a lawn by one of the parents, whicli
burning gasoline severely burned the plaintiff. On appeal,
Held: Affirmed. A parent is not ordinarily responsible for
the wrongful act of his minor child. To be charged, the
parent must induce or approve of the act, or the child must
be at the time the servant or agent of the parent.
On a later trial of the second principal case under an
amended declaration against the mother and child only,
which alleged that the child ignited the gasoline under the
orders and direction of the mother, the trial court enteredjudgment for the plaintiff on a verdict in her favor. On ap-
peal, Held: Affirmed. There was sufficient evidence to go
to the jury, the prayers challenging the sufficiency of plain-
tiff's evidence at close of his case were insufficient, when re-
offered, to challenge the sufficiency of evidence in the entire
case.' Beyond this the case, on the second appeal, did not
involve any point of the responsibility of parent for the tort
of a child.
These two fairly recent cases, each one appealed twice,
suggest an inquiry into the bases of holding a parent re-
sponsible for the tort of a child. The cases themselves indi-
cate that such responsibility does not follow automatically
from the relation of parent and child, but that other factors
must be juxtaposed with the relationship to reach the end of
liability. As the automobile presents the greater number
of such problems, as witness the first principal case, the dis-
cussion will be broadened to include the various bases of
holding responsible the owner of an automobile for damage
caused by another person's operation of it.
Perhaps the most fundamental basis for holding a par-
ent for the tort of a child, or a car owner for the damage
caused by another's operation of it, is that of the actual
'Rounds, Admr. v. Phillips, 168 Md. 120, 177 At. 174 (1935).
Carroll et al. v. Kerrigen (sic), 197 At. 127 (Md. 1938).
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agency of the child or driver at the time of the tort.6 Thus,
if the child or driver be engaged in the business of the par-
ent or owner, liability may be imposed. In the second ap-
peal of the second principal case, there was involved a judg-
ment upon such a declaration, which alleged that the child's
act was done under the direction of the defendant parent.
Quite a few jurisdictions in this country have adopted
the so-called "family car doctrine", which serves to hold
liable the responsible head of a family who provides an
automobile for the use of the members of his family, when
one of them causes damage in the course of such use. Mary-
land has consistently rejected this doctrine, most recently in
the first appeal of the first principal case.'
A third view, rejected in Maryland,' and, apparently,
adopted in only one state,9 is that of the inherently danger-
ous instrumentality, which analogizes the automobile to a
wild animal and holds the owner responsible just as he
would be for damage caused by a wild animal he knowingly
let run at large. The analogy would seem inept, for it is
unusual to keep an automobile chained up. The first appeal
of the first principal case reiterated the rejection of the doc-
trine.
A fourth view is that of the potentially dangerous instru-
nentality, which, as applied to an automobile, the Court
adopted in the first appeal of the first principal case, where
it recognized the automobile as such a potentially dangerous
instrumentality and enforced liability against one who
knowingly permitted a reckless and incompetent person to
operate one. It would be interesting to speculate as to the
extent to which the corollary to this is that one who permits
a car to be used, knowing that it is in defective condition,
will be held responsibile for damages resulting therefrom.0
A fifth view is statutory in some states, to hold the owner
of a car responsible for damages caused with it by any one
who is using it with the owner's permission. Maryland has
no such statute. Such statutes are predicated upon assign-
* Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 Atl. 446, 72 A. L. R. 449 (1930)-
(dictum).
v See also Myers v. Shipley, 140 Md. 380, 116 Atl. 645 (1922); and
Baitary v. Smith, 140 Md. 437, 116 Atl. 651 (1922).8 Symington v. Sipes, 121 Md. 313, 88 Atl. 134, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 662
(1913).
* Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 16 A. L,. R.
255 (1920) ; Herr v. Butler et al., 101 Fla. 1125, 132 So. 815 (1931) ; Engle-
man v. Traeger, 107 Fla. 756, 136 So. 527; Greene v. Miller et ux, 102 Fla.
767, 136 So. 532 (1931). But see Williams et al. v. Younghusband et al.,
57 Fed. (2nd) 139 (C. C. A. 5th Ct. from D. Ct. Fla. 1932).
10 Foster v. Farra, 117 Ore. 286, 243 Pac. 778 (1926) ; Texas Co. v. Veloz,
162 S. W. 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
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ing the duty to respond in damages to the person best cal-
culated to be capable to bear that burden-the owner of the
car-and upon the idea that providing a car for another's
use is, in substance, if not in common law, the proximate
cause of the accident.
A sixth source is accidental, rather than legal. Fre-
quently policies of automobile liability insurance are so
written as to protect others than the insured, if driving his
car with his permission. To the extent which injured par-
sons can force the insurance companies to pay them under
such policies, written as guarantees against liability, they
provide avenues for collecting from the insured parent or
insured car owner, as the case may be.
ILLICIT COHABITATION OF PARTIES AS
AFFECTING CONTRACTS MADE
BETWEEN THEM
Baxter v. Wilburn1
Plaintiff-appellant brought a bill in equity against his
former mistress to enforce a mortgage against certain resi-
dential property he had bought for her and had caused to be
conveyed to her alone. The mortgage, executed to him by
her at the time of the purchase, was left in her custody, and
was orally agreed to be recorded and have effect only in the
event that she predeceased him. This plan, if successful,
was calculated not only to deprive plaintiff's wife of any
rights in the property, but also to secure to him a return of
his investment in the eventuality of the prior death of the
grantee. The parties became estranged, and plaintiff sought
to establish and foreclose his lien at once. Plaintiff's bill
did not connect the mortgage with the illicit cohabitation of
the parties, but he did testify that he would not have put up
any money for the property if he had not thought that the
woman would associate with -him as man and wife, and that
the mortgage was to have no effect "provided we lived to-
gether and everything was all right." The lower court dis-
missed the bill, holding the entire transaction to be per-
meated by the illicit relationship of the parties and there-
fore not compatible with equitable relief. On appeal, Held:
Affirmed. Contracts promoting illicit cohabitation are void
and unenforceable in equity. Although the factor of im-
moral sexual relations would not itself necessarily invali-
1190 AtI. 773 (Md. 1937).
